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NOTES
THE NOTARI' ALTERNATIVE: A BETTER APPROACH TO
THE SQUARE-PEG-ROUND-HOLE PROBLEM FOUND IN
REVERSE DISCRIMINATION CASES
I NTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") prohibits
discrimination "against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
2
Title VII creates a comprehensive scheme, defining unfair employ-
ment practices and providing a federal cause of action for victims of
invidious discrimination in the workplace
Recognizing the difficulty of proving intentional discrimination
in the absence of direct evidence, the Supreme Court, in its water-
shed 1973 decision McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,4 estab-
lished a framework for determining the existence of Title VII race-
based employment discrimination on the basis of indirect evidence.
Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff alleging intentional dispa-
rate treatment s under Title VII bears the initial burden of establish-
1 Notari v. Denver Water Dep't, 971 F.2d 585 (10th Cir. 1992).
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988). Section 703 of the Act provides in pertinent part:
(a) Employer Practices. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or oth-
erwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
Id.
4 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
5 The Supreme Court's 1977 decision in Intemational Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977) defined disparate treatment as
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ing a prima facie case of racial discrimination.6 A plaintiff attempt-
ing to do so may accomplish this by proving the following
elements:
1) that he belongs to a racial minority; 2) that he applied and was quali-
fied for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; 3) that,
despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and 4) that, after his rejection,
the position remained open and the employer continued to seek appli-
cants from persons of complainant's qualifications.7
If the plaintiff makes such a showing, the burden then shifts to the
employer to articulate a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the employee's rejection."8 Finally, if the employer provides such a
reason, the burden of proof then returns to the plaintiff to prove that
the employer's stated reason is in fact a pretext for intentional
discrimination.'
The McDonnell Douglas scheme has been consistently applied
in "traditional" discrimination cases where the plaintiff alleging race-
based discrimination is a minority.'" In these cases, an "inference
of discrimination" arises when the employer rejects a plaintiff's
application for a position for which he is qualified." A more com-
plex problem results, however, in the case where the plaintiff is not
a member of a minority group. Although this plaintiff, often termed
a "reverse discrimination" 2 plaintiff, is entitled to Title VII protec-
the most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats
some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it
can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treat-
ment. . . . Undoubtedly disparate treatment was the most obvious evil
Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII.
Id.
6 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 804. The Supreme Court has held that when an employer provides a non-
discriminatory reason for an employment decision, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
prove his case "either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more
likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered
explanation is unworthy of credence.' Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
" See, e.g., Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); McDonald v.
Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C.
Cir. 1981).
1 See Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577.
12 See Parker v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1013 (D.C. Cir.
1981); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1319 (6th ed. 1990) (defining 'reverse discrimi-
nation' as "[a] type of discrimination in which majority groups are purportedly discrimi-
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tion, the Supreme Court has not addressed whether or how the
McDonnell Douglas criteria must be modified as applied to such
claims. 3
Circuit and district courts addressing this issue have produced
conflicting views. Focusing largely on the first prong of the tradi-
tional McDonnell Douglas test, the element requiring that the plain-
tiff advance proof of his status as a minority, these decisions fall
across a spectrum of interpretations. At one end are the D.C. and
Sixth Circuits, which have held that the first prong should be modi-
fied for a reverse discrimination plaintiff."4 This modification is
commonly referred to as the "background circumstances" test.1 s
This test requires the plaintiff to surmount the difficult hurdle of
offering direct evidence of "background circumstances support[ing]
the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who
discriminates against the majority." 6 At the other end is the Elev-
enth Circuit view expressed in Wilson v. Bailey, which wholly
rejects the "background circumstances" test and simply requires that
the plaintiff prove that he is a member of "a class." 7 Between
these two views is the approach advanced by the Fourth Circuit in
Holmes v. Bevilacqua, 6 a traditional discrimination case, and then
applied by the Tenth Circuit in Notari v. Denver Water Dep't' 9 to
the reverse discrimination context. Under this approach, the "back-
ground circumstances" test is utilized; however, an alternative test is
available to the plaintiff who cannot meet this burden.2" Under this
test, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of reverse discrimi-
nation under Title VII by offering direct evidence of discrimination
or by indirect evidence sufficient to support with reasonable proba-
bility the inference that but for the plaintiff's race he would have
nated against in favor of minority groups).
13 See Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
14 See generally Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796 (6th Cir. 1994);
Parker, 652 F.2d at 1017.
15 See Parker, 652 F.2d at 1017.
16 Id.
17 Wilson v. Bailey, 934 F.2d 301, 304 (11th Cir. 1991). Wilson did not provide a
definition of "a class' within the context of the McDonnell Douglas framework. See id.
The ambiguity surrounding the Eleventh Circuit approach is discussed in further detail.
See infra notes 108-35 and accompanying text.
" 794 F.2d 142 (4th Cir. 1986).




been promoted.2 This approach has the effect of ameliorating the
inconsistency resulting from the imposition of an elevated standard
upon a reverse discrimination plaintiff.
This Note argues that the best approach to the "square-peg-
round-hole" problem inevitably found in reverse discrimination
cases is that applied by the Tenth Circuit. Part I of this Note discuss-
es the background history of Title VII and the nature of the
McDonnell Douglas test, including its application to reverse dis-
crimination claims. Part II discusses each of the approaches to re-
verse discrimination claims advanced by the circuit courts. Finally,
Part III challenges the sufficiency of the "background circumstances"
test, suggesting that, in addition to this test, the alternative test ap-
plied by the Tenth Circuit should be offered to the reverse discrimi-
nation plaintiff who is unable to prove the requisite "background
circumstances."
I. TITLE VII AND REVERSE DISCRIMINATION
A. History of Title VII
On July 2, 1964, after submitting numerous civil rights bills,
the Eighty-eighth Congress passed H.R. 7152,22 the "Civil Rights
Act," which defined unfair employment practices and provided for
their prevention. 23 This bill was signed by President Johnson on
the same date.24
21 Id.
2 110 CONG. REC. 15897 (1964).
1 Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431,
457 (1966).
24 Id. During his term as Vice President of the United States, Lyndon Baines Johnson
had not made clear to his colleagues his commitment to H.R. 7152; however, shortly
after his inauguration following President Kennedy's death he stated:
[N]o memorial oration or eulogy could more eloquently honor President
Kennedy's memory than the earliest passage of the civil rights bill for which
he fought so long. We have talked long enough in this country about equal
rights .. . I urge you ... to enact a civil rights law so that we can move
forward to eliminate from this Nation any trace of discrimination and oppres-
sion that is based on race or color. There could be no greater source of
strength to this Nation both at home and abroad.
CHARLES & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964
CIVIL RIGHTS AcT 75, 79 (Seven Locks Press 1985). In his Memorial Day address at Get-
tysburg National Cemetery, President Johnson stated the following: "Until justice is blind
to color, until education is aware of race, until opportunity is unconcerned with the
color of men's skins, emancipation will be a proclamation but not a fact." Id. at 76.
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The passage of the Civil Rights Act marked the beginning of a
fundamental change to the lives of all Americans. Title VII, found
within such Act, established the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") and marked its task: to ensure that all indi-
viduals are given an evenhanded opportunity for employment and
promotion on the basis of ability and qualification, without regard
to race, color, sex, religion or national origin.2" Although its legis-
lative history underscored the need to provide increased employ-
ment opportunity to minority persons, 6 the neutral language of the
statute reveals that the scope of Title VII was intended to reach
persons of all races, including non-minorities."'
This principle is exemplified in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transportation Company where the Supreme Court held that the
protection of white persons against discriminatory practices was
within the purview of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.28 In its holding,
the McDonald Court further provided that Title VII prohibits dis-
crimination against majority citizens, as well as against minorities,
and protects white persons from discrimination under the same
standards employed to protect non-whites.29
Also, particularly instructive as to the scope of Title VII protec-
tion is the Supreme Court's 1971 opinion in Griggs v. Duke Power
Company" In Griggs, Chief Justice Burger wrote:
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
In his second special message to the Eightyeighth Congress on civil rights, Presi-
dent Kennedy 'stress[ed] that the relief of [African American] unemployment required
progress in three major areas, namely, creating more jobs through greater economic
growth, raising the level of skills through more education and training and eliminating
racial discrimination in employment.' Vaas, supra note 23, at 432 (citing 109 CONG.
REC. 3245, 11174 (1963)).
21 See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-80 (1976).
28 Id. at 286-87.
Id. at 280. The Court further provided that
mhe EEOC, whose interpretations are entitled to great deference . . . has
consistently interpreted Title VII to proscribe racial discrimination in private
employment against whites on the same terms as racial discrimination against
nonwhites, holding that to proceed otherwise would 'constitute a derogation of
the Commission's congressional mandate to eliminate all practices which oper-
ate to disadvantage the employment opportunities of any group protected by
Title VII, including Caucasians.'. . . This conclusion is in accord with uncon-
tradicted legislative history to the effect that Title VII was intended to "cover
white men and white women and all Americans,' . and create an "obliga-
tion not to discriminate against whites; ....
Id. at 279-80 (citations omitted).
30 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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[Title VII] does not command that any person be hired simply because he
was formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he is a member of
a minority group. Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or
majority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed. What is
required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unneces-
sary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to
discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification. 1
B. The McDonnell Douglas Framework
The plaintiff in McDonnell Douglas was a black citizen who
worked for the defendant's aerospace and aircraft manufacturing
operation as a mechanic and laboratory technician. 2 His employ-
ment lasted approximately eight years, until he was laid off during
the course of a reduction in the defendant's workforce.3 As a
long-time activist in the civil rights movement, the plaintiff protested
that his discharge, as well as the defendant's general hiring practic-
es, were racially motivated. 4 As part of his protest, the plaintiff
and other members of the Congress on Racial Equality ("CORE")3"
illegally stalled their cars on the main roads leading to the
defendant's manufacturing plant for the purpose of blocking access
to and egress from the plant at the time of the morning shift
change. 6 When asked by police to remove his car, the plaintiff
refused. 7 His car was then towed away, and the plaintiff was ar-
rested for obstructing traffic. 8 Following the "stall-in," a "lock-in"
took place at the defendant's plant wherein a chain and padlock
were placed on the front door of a building to prevent the occu-
31 Id. at 430-41.
32 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 794.
33 Id.
3 Id.
3' The Congress on Racial Equality is a civil rights organization formed in 1942 to
desegregate public facilities. Of its most notable demonstrations was the 'Freedom Ride,'
during which two interracial groups of students rode buses together across several south-
em states, in protest of the laws segregating public facilities in those states. See AUGUST
MEIER & ELLOT M. RUDWICK, CORE: A STUDY IN THE CIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1942-1968,
4, 135-145 (1973).
- 411 U.S. at 795.
17 Id. at 795.
3 Id.
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pants, many of whom were the defendant's employees, from exit-
ing.39 The plaintiff apparently knew of the planned lock-in; howev-
er, the extent of his involvement was uncertain.4"
Approximately three weeks following this event, the defendant
publicly advertised for qualified mechanics, at which point the
plaintiff applied for re-employment.4' The defendant turned down
the plaintiff, basing its rejection on the plaintiff's participation in the
"stall-in" and "lock-in."42 The plaintiff then filed a formal complaint
with the EEOC, claiming that the defendant's refusal to rehire him
was motivated by both his race and his involvement in the civil
rights movement.43 The plaintiff subsequently brought suit alleging
racial discrimination, despite the fact that the EEOC had made no
finding validating the plaintiff's allegations with respect to racial bi-
as.44 The district court dismissed the plaintiff's claim of racial
discrimination.4 s
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the dismissal, noting that
the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of racial discrimina-
tion.4" In remanding the case to the district court, the court of ap-
peals attempted to outline standards to govern the consideration of
the plaintiff's claim. 47 The Supreme Court, recognizing the appar-
ent "lack of harmony" among lower courts, 48 granted certiorari in
order to clarify those standards which govern the disposition of an
action alleging employment discrimination.49
Although the McDonnell Douglas Court established a three-part
paradigm for "traditional" employment discrimination, 0 it recog-
nized that the elements of the prima facie case may not apply "in
every respect to differing factual situations."5 ' As such, the Court
implied that these criteria should be flexibly applied to accommo-
39 Id.
40 Id. at 795.
4, McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 796.
42 Id.
43 Id.
4" Id. at 796-97.
41 Id. at 797.
46 411 U.S. at 797.
17 Id. The court of appeals held that the defendant's refusal to rehire the plaintiff
rested on 'subjective criteria, which did not make a strong case for rebutting the
plaintiff's presumption of discrimination. Id. at 798.
43 Id. at 801.
41 Id. at 798.
10 See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
11 411 U.S. at 802 n.13.
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date the facts of the case at hand. 2 For example, in Texas Depart-
ment of Community Affairs v. Burdine,53 the Supreme Court modi-
fied the first element of the prima facie case to accommodate sexual
discrimination claims, requiring that a female plaintiff demonstrate
only that she is a qualified woman.14 Similarly, in Bundy v. Jack-
son,"5 the D.C. Circuit modified the McDonnell Douglas test for
claims raised in the context of discrimination in competitive promo-
tion decisions.56 The new test resembled the same first three
prongs as the McDonnell Douglas test,57 while the fourth prong
was replaced with the requirement that "other employees of similar
qualifications who were not members of the protected group were
indeed promoted at the time the plaintiff's request for promotion
was denied." 8 Thus, although neither Burdine nor Bundy relate to
reverse discrimination, each serves to illustrate that the McDonnell
Douglas criterion may be properly applied to all types of
discrimination.
Further, in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 9 the Su-
preme Court clarified the underlying purpose of the prima facie test.
Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist explained that the role of
the prima facie case was to permit investigation into the inquiry of
whether the employer is "treating some people less favorably than
others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin.""0 Justice Rehnquist further provided that the method for doing
so, the McDonnell Douglas prima facie test, "was never intended to
be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.""1 Accordingly, although the
Furnco Court did not reach the issue of reverse discrimination, it
nevertheless implied that the prima facie test could be applied in
order to permit an inquiry into all types of race-based employment
discrimination. 2
52 Id. at 802; see also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
253 n.6 (1981).
53 450 U.S. 248, 252-54 & n.6 (1981).
Id.
55 641 F.2d 934, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
56 Id.
5' See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
-" 641 F.2d at 951.
59 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
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II. THE CIRCUIT COURT APPROACHES TO REVERSE DISCRIMINATION
The decision of the D.C. Circuit in Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio
R.R. Co. 63 has proven extremely influential in the sphere of reverse
discrimination cases. The plaintiff in Parker was a white male who
was employed by the B&O Railroad for approximately four years."
For three years (1975-78), he actively sought transfer or promotion
to the job of locomotive fireman. 6' His requests, however, went
unfulfilled.66 The plaintiff charged B&O with race and gender dis-
crimination in violation of Title VII, alleging that his employer gave
"illegal preferences" to minority and female applicants.67
In addressing the plaintiff's claim, the court drew heavily upon
McDonnell Douglas, recognizing, however, that the prima facie
standard would necessarily require modification in its applicability
to reverse discrimination claims. 68 The court noted that although
the standard was developed to establish a prima facie case for any
member of a protected group under Title VII, including white males,
it would nevertheless be illogical "to suggest that the promotion of
a black employee justifies an inference of prejudice against white
co-workers in our present society."
69
In developing a standard appropriate for reverse discrimination
cases, the court7" drew upon its 1981 opinion in Daye v. Har-
ris.7' In Daye, the court analyzed a challenged promotion within a
hospital's nursing staff, finding that a majority of the nurses on the
staff were black, and they received a disproportionately large num-
ber of the promotions awarded.72 This finding, in addition to other
inconsistent practices, led the court .to conclude that the plaintiff
was entitled to use the McDonnell Douglas framework for the prima
facie case.73 Accordingly, evidence of a racially discriminatory
' 652 F.2d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
' Id. at 1013.
6S Id.
6 Id.
67 Id. at 1014-15.
" 652 F.2d at 1017.
69 Id.
7 Id. at 1017-18.
71 655 F.2d 258 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
72 Id. at 260.
11 Id. The inconsistent practices noted in Daye included granting black employees
certain awards to increase their qualifications and temporarily "downgrading' the perfor-
mance evaluations of white employees pending promotion decisions. Id. at 260-61.
1998]
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working environment served as a "functional equivalent" of the first
prong of the McDonnell Douglas criteria, membership in a racial
minority.74
The Parker court further developed the Daye court's holding in
order to formulate what is commonly referred to today as the aback-
ground circumstances" test."' This standard requires the reverse
discrimination plaintiff who wishes to use the McDonnell Douglas
framework to demonstrate that "background circumstances support
the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who
discriminates against the majority." 76
Following the Parker decision, Harding v. Gray emerged from
the D.C. Circuit.77 In Harding, Chief Judge Mikva elaborated upon
the "background circumstances" test he created some twelve years
earlier in Parker.78 The opinion clarified the purpose behind creat-
ing an elevated standard for the reverse discrimination plaintiff.79
In relevant part, Judge Mikva explained that
in an ordinary discrimination case, in which the plaintiff is a member of a
minority group, an inference of discrimination arises when the employer
simply passes over the plaintiff for a promotion to a position for which he
is qualified. No such inference arises when, as in this case, the plaintiff is
a white man. Invidious racial discrimination against whites is relatively
uncommon in our society, and so there is nothing inherently suspicious in
an employer's decision to promote a qualified minority applicant instead
of a qualified white applicant."0
Harding worked as a carpenter at a hospital operated first by
the United States Government, and then by the District of Colum-
bia.81 After ten years of employment, he was promoted to "carpen-
ter leader." 2 Although the position was designated as "non-super-
visory," Harding was in fact responsible for overseeing a group of
three or more carpenters. 3 He subsequently applied for the posi-
tion of "carpentry/upholstery shop foreman," a position which re-
74 652 F.2d at 1018.
'5 Id. at 1017. See Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1993).76 Parker v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
7 9 F.3d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
7 Id.
79 Id.
"0 Id. at 153 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
81 Id. at 151.
82 9 F.3d at 151.
a Id.
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quired, among other things, the "ability to supervise."84 In making
its decision, the defendants passed over Harding for a black woman
holding a "supervisory" position."5 Harding brought suit, alleging
that the defendants had denied him the position because of his
race, in violation of Title VII. 6 In addition, he asserted that his
qualifications were superior to those of the individual selected for
the position and "that a claim of superior qualifications raises an
inference of discrimination sufficient to state a prima facie case."87
The Harding court provided two general categories of evidence
which may be found to constitute "background circumstances." The
first is evidence indicating that the particular employer at issue has
some reason or inclination to discriminate invidiously against
whites.88 The second is evidence indicating that there is something
suspect about the facts of the case at hand that raises an inference
of discrimination.89
In addressing Harding's claim, the court focused on the latter
category, holding that if supported by the facts of the case, a
plaintiff's superior qualifications can constitute sufficient background
circumstances to establish a prima facie case.90 As such, the court
held that an inference of discrimination will arise if evidence is
offered of a more qualified white applicant being denied a promo-
tion in favor of a minority applicant with lesser qualifications."
" Id.
as Id.
86 Id. at 152.
11 9 F.3d at 152.
11 Id. at 153. The court reviewed several of its prior decisions to find evidence
falling into this category. See, e.g., Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 788 F.2d 781, 786-
87 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (among other factors, minority supervisors and proposed affirmative
action plan); Lanphear v. Prokop, 703 F.2d 1311, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (pressure on
hiring authority to hire minorities and proposed affirmative action plan); Daye v. Harris,
655 F.2d 258, 261 (D.D.C. 1981) (minority nurses over-represented among promotees).
a9 9 F.3d at 151. The court indicated a number of situations which have arisen to
demonstrate this general category. See Bishopp, 788 F.2d at 786-87 (promotee was less
qualified than four white plaintiffs and was promoted 'over thelir] heads . . . in an
unprecedented fashion"); Lanphear, 703 F.2d at 1315 (plaintiff was given 'little or no
consideration' for the promotion, and supervisor never fully reviewed qualifications of
minority promotee); Daye, 655 F.2d at 260-61 (plaintiff alleged "scheme' to fix perfor-
mance ratings).
90 9 F.3d at 151. The court noted that "[b]ackground circumstances need not mean
'some circumstance in the employer's background," but rather, evidence about the




In what appears to be an effort to thwart criticism of the "back-
ground circumstances" test, Chief Judge Mikva attempted to down-
play the disproportionate effects cast upon the reverse discrimina-
tion plaintiff by imposing an elevated standard. Judge Mikva
explained that
[t]his requirement is not designed to disadvantage the white plaintiff, who
is entitled to the same Title VII protection as a minority plaintiff. Instead
the background circumstances requirement merely substitutes for the
minority plaintiff's burden to show that he is a member of a racial minori-
ty; both are criteria for determining when the employer's conduct raises
an inference of discrimination.92
Although the opinion purports to illuminate the underlying purpose
of imposing the "background circumstances" test, it manifests itself
as an attempt to gloss over the inescapable reality of the impact of
such a test-that the non-minority plaintiff will find himself faced
with a higher, more onerous burden of proof than that of his
minority counterpart.93
Despite its shortcomings, however, the "background circum-
stances" approach has been followed by a number of district and
circuit courts. 94 In its 1985 decision in Murray v. Thistledown Rac-
ing Club, Inc., the Sixth Circuit noted that the first prong of the
prima facie test 95 should be replaced with the "background circum-
stances" test set forth by the D.C. Circuit, and the remaining three
prongs 6 be replaced by the requirement "that the employer treated
differently employees who were similarly situated but not members
of the protected group."97 The court reasoned that such approach
92 Id. (citations omitted).
Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
See, e.g., Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796 (6th Cir. 1994);
Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63 (6th Cir. 1985); Davis v.
Sheraton Soc'y Hill Hotel, 907 F. Supp. 896, 902 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
9 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
SId.
97 770 F.2d 63, 67 (6th Cir. 1985). In justifying a modification of the traditional
McDonnell Douglas scheme, Judge Keith further stated that
[tihe premise underlying the varied McDonnell Douglas standards remains un-
changed. It stems from Congressional efforts to address this nation's history of
discrimination against racial minorities, a legacy of racism so entrenched that
we presume acts, otherwise unexplained, embody its effect. As stated by the
McDonnell Douglas Court, the primary purpose of Title VII is 'to assure
equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminating
practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments
to the disadvantage of minority citizens.'
Id. (citations omitted).
[Vol. 64: 1
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would be consistent with the Supreme Court's mandate that the
McDonnell Douglas test be modified to accommodate different
employment discrimination contexts.98 Nine years later, the Sixth
Circuit applied the same test in Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins.
Co.99 However, in applying the "background circumstances" por-
tion of this test, Judge Cleland conceded that the court had "serious
misgivings about the soundness of a test which imposes a more
onerous standard for plaintiffs who are white or male than for their
non-white or female counterparts."" °
The "background circumstances" test, although perhaps the
most widely accepted approach to reverse discrimination cases, has,
in fact, been staunchly opposed by many courts, particularly the
Eleventh Circuit. In Wilson v. Bailey,'' the Eleventh Circuit modi-
fied the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas test as applied to
reverse discrimination suits, requiring the plaintiff to prove only that
he is a "member of a class."" 2 This test substantially lowered the
hurdle for the reverse discrimination plaintiff, evincing a wholesale
rejection of the "background circumstances" test.
Wilson involved two white male deputy sheriffs, each seeking a
position as "sheriff's sergeant." 3 Although both of these men
were twice certified as candidates for the position, they were twice
denied promotions." In the two certifications, the sheriff inter-
viewed eight minority or women candidates, offering six candidates
promotions." Plaintiffs brought an action in the Northern District
of Alabama alleging discrimination by the City of Birmingham in its
employment practices."° An appeal to the Eleventh Circuit ensued
following the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
defendant." 7
9 Id.
" Pierce, 40 F.3d at 801.
100 Id. at 801 n.7. Judge Cleland also noted that the "background circumstances' test
has been criticized by other courts as 'impermissibly imposing a 'heightened standard'
upon reverse discrimination plaintiffs.' Id. (citing Ulrich v. Exxon Co., 824 F. Supp. 677,
683-84 (S.D. Tex. 1993)).
101 934 F.2d 301 (11th Cir. 1991).
101 Id. at 304.
-03 Id. at 302-03.
104 Id.
100 Id. at 303.
I06 934 F.2d at 302.
107 Id. at 303.
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In addressing the reverse discrimination claims on appeal, the
Wilson court applied the traditional prima facie test, replacing the
first prong °8 of the McDonnell Douglas framework with the re-
quirement that the plaintiff prove that he "belongs to a class."" 9
However, this opinion, although followed by many courts, failed to
offer sufficient justification for creating a standard which allows the
reverse discrimination plaintiff to automatically satisfy the first prong
of the McDonnell Douglas test solely by virtue of his status as a
"member of a class." 10
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Eleventh Circuit Approach
As noted by the Seventh Circuit, "racial discrimination against
whites is forbidden ... but no presumption of discrimination can
be based on the mere fact that a white is passed over in favor of a
black.""' As such, a modification of the McDonnell Douglas test
must be properly contrived in order to establish some form of tangi-
ble proof, whether direct or indirect, of race-based discrimination in
violation of Title VII. Otherwise, the application of a standard such
as that articulated by the Eleventh Circuit is likely to lead to some
incongruous results in cases involving affirmative action." 2
The Supreme Court, in its 1979 decision in United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber, held that the plain language of
Title VII does not prohibit the adoption of "race-conscious affirma-
tive action plans.""' 3 The Weber Court focused on the legislative
history of Title VII, which reflects a congressional purpose to re-
" See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
'09 34 F.2d at 304.
.. Although the Wilson court did not expressly define membership in "a class," other
courts declining to apply the "background circumstances" test have held that membership
in a protected group specifically enumerated in Title VII suffices to meet the first prong
of the McDonnell Douglas criteria. See, e.g., Ulrich, 824 F. Supp at 683 n.3; Collins v.
School District of Kansas City, Mo., 727 F. Supp. 1318, 1322 CW.D. Mo. 1990).
. Ustrak v. Fairman, 781 F.2d 573, 577 (7th Cir. 1986).
112 The term "affirmative action" originated pursuant to an executive order by Presi-
dent Kennedy, the goal of which was to: 1) remedy discrimination against traditionally
disfavored minorities; 2) create a program requiring employers to advertise as "equal
opportunity employer[s]"; and 3) to provide incentives for employers to recruit qualified
minority persons for admission or training programs. Steven J. Wisotsky, Beyond Reverse
Discrimination: The Quest for a Legitimizing Principle, 4 NOVA L.J. 63 (1980).
13 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979).
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verse an increasing trend toward invidious discrimination in the
workplace."' Because Congress' primary objective in enacting the
prohibition against racial discrimination in Title VII was with "the
plight of the [African-American] in our economy," the Court rea-
soned that any reading of Title VII that suggested the prohibition of
affirmative action plans designed to eradicate "traditional patterns"
of racial discrimination "would bring about an end completely at
variance with the purpose of the statute .... ,11s Following an ex-
tensive review of the legislative history in support of this proposi-
tion, the Court concluded that
[i]t would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over
centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of those who
had "been excluded from the American dream for so long," constituted
the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious ef-
forts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy. 6
Arguably, however, the same affirmative action plans which
have been enforced in order to erode past invidious discrimination
in the workplace may bear the unfortunate result of muddying the
waters in the reverse discrimination context. In Parker, the D.C.
Circuit noted that "a lawful affirmative action program [cannot] in
itself constitute suspicious circumstances sufficient to justify an
inference of discriminatory intent."17 If such an inference were
permitted, this would pose a real risk of discouraging the consider-
ation or adoption of lawful affirmative action plans. Similarly, the
Seventh Circuit explained in adopting Parker's reasoning that
"[niational policy permits the use of voluntary affirmative action
programs to remedy the legacy of discrimination. For the courts to
discourage the use of such programs by treating them as evidence
in themselves of the very discrimination they are designed to eradi-
cate would be improper."" 8 Despite the observations of both the
D.C. and Seventh Circuits, the presence of affirmative action plans
11 Id. at 201-02.
"s Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).
216 Id. at 204.
17 Parker v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 n.9 (D.C. Cir.
1981).




in the workplace remains a source of confusion and has elicited
much debate among the circuits in devising an appropriate prima
facie standard.
Pursuant to the Supreme Court's affirmation of the legality of
affirmative action plans, the application of the McDonnell Douglas
criteria necessitates a modification to differentiate between actual
invidious discrimination against non-minorities and the residual
effects of a plan enacted to ameliorate past discrimination against
their minority counterparts." 9 Accordingly, it is necessary to apply
a test which will serve to disentangle the effects of affirmative action
in order to identify those circumstances where actual invidious
discrimination operates in such a way to disadvantage certain indi-
viduals who are not members of historically or socially disfavored
groups. Under the Eleventh Circuit's version of the McDonnell
Douglas test, this will be an extremely difficult, if not impossible,
task.
Adherence to the Eleventh Circuit standard may itself lead to
the premature demise of one of the most important remedial mea-
sures in the history of our country-the affirmative action program.
In fact, the application of the unmodified McDonnell Douglas crite-
ria as it applies to traditional discrimination claims will entitle the
reverse discrimination plaintiff to automatically state a prima facie
case in the presence of any affirmative action plan, regardless of its
validity.
For example, a majority plaintiff who is rejected pursuant to a
legitimate affirmative action plan will be permitted to satisfy the first
prong 2' of the McDonnell Douglas scheme by virtue of his mem-
bership in a class-Caucasian. The next three prongs 2' will be
satisfied as well, solely due to the presence of the affirmative action
plan. Thus, employers contemplating the enforcement of legitimate
affirmative action plans will be discouraged from doing so simply
because they will be aware that their actions alone will be enough
to enable a reverse discrimination plaintiff to state a prima facie
case of discrimination.
119 The Supreme Court has determined that close judicial scrutiny should be exercised
in evaluating the legitimacy of affirmative action plans. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978).
"2 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
121 Id.
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The Wilson opinion and its progeny perpetrate the myth that all
disparate treatment cases are created equally under Title VII, and
that the McDonnell Douglas scheme must be formally adhered to in
all such cases, regardless of whether they deal with traditional or
reverse discrimination. Such reasoning is flawed because it runs
counter to both the Supreme Court's mandate that the McDonnell
Douglas criteria be flexibly applied'22 and the background history
of Title VII. The line of cases following the Wilson approach take
advantage of the statute's neutral language, using it to erect an
arbitrary barrier for courts attempting to develop standards appro-
priate for reverse discrimination cases. The simple fact is that al-
though the statute was intended to read neutrally, the standards
used in enforcing it cannot be, themselves, neutral if the results are
to fall evenhandedly upon Americans of all races, genders, religions
and the like. By permitting an "inference of discrimination" in the
case of a majority plaintiff, the Wilson approach creates an unilater-
al advantage for this plaintiff over his minority counterparts. This
prospect is inconsistent with the objectives of Title VII and ignores
the deep-seated problem of discrimination in this Nation's history, a
problem mandating such an "inference of discrimination." As such,
the color-blind and seemingly empty standard applied by the Elev-
enth Circuit undermines the ultimate goal of the McDonnell
Douglas test-to establish some proof of discriminatory intent.
B. Why the "Background Circumstances" Test is Insufficient
The meaning of "traditional" race-based discrimination is rooted
in American history. Following the Civil War and the enactment of
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Consti-
tution, the legal status of former American slaves was redefined.
However, due to their minority status, blacks in the United States
continued to be encumbered by invidious racial discrimination,
resulting in a marked difficulty in procuring employment. The Civil
Rights Act of 1964 represented the most significant legislation affect-
ing black Americans; its enforcement would afford all minorities in
the United States an equal opportunity to obtain employment and to
secure promotions.
122 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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In light of historical practice in the workplace, and hostility
toward such socially disfavored groups, a plaintiff's minority status
is, in and of itself, sufficient to give rise to an inference of discrimi-
natory motivation.123 In the case of the majority plaintiff, however,
such individual's status will not give rise to an inference of discrimi-
nation, absent proof of disparate treatment. 12 4 This reasoning was
the Parker court's primary motivation in adopting the "background
circumstances" test, and is supported by the background history of
Title VII. 125
Although the "background circumstances" test has been reject-
ed by some circuit courts, the only explicit criticism of this test
comes from a district court decision, Collins v. School District of
Kansas City, Missouri. 26 The Collins court criticized the Parker
requirement as, among other things, "effectively eliminat[ing]" the
McDonnell Douglas framework.'27
Although the "background circumstances" test summons a
much higher level of proof than does the traditional McDonnell
Douglas presumption, the Collins court is misguided in concluding
that its application altogether eliminates the prima facie test. Rather,
a plaintiff offering proof of background circumstances will be enti-
tled to use the McDonnell Douglas framework, as this proof will
give rise to an inference of discrimination.
The fact that the McDonnell Douglas criteria takes a different
form when applied to reverse discrimination cases is inevitable. In
devising the prima facie test in 1973, the Supreme Court made no
reference to reverse discrimination, nor did it have reason to con-
template that this test would be applied to such cases. In fact, the
first use of the term "reverse discrimination" was not until 1974 in
media commentary'28 following the Supreme Court decision in
DeFunis v. Odegaard.'29 In response to the Supreme Court's si-
3 Parker v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 727 F. Supp. 1318 (W.D. Mo. 1990).
127 Id. at 1321.
128 Kilpatrick, The Defunis Syndrome, NATON's BUSINESS, June, Vol. 62 at 13 (1974).
The article read, "A more formal name for [the] abnormality [of racial discrimination of
non-minority group members] is 'reverse discrimination.' The short and ugly word is
racism.' Id.
'2 416 U.S. 312 (1974). Defunis involved a challenge of the procedures and criteria
of a law school's admissions committee. The plaintiff, who had been denied admission,
had received a higher "composite' score than his minority counterparts who were admit-
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lence on the issue, the Parker and Harding courts interpreted
McDonnell Douglas and its progeny13  as allowing for the use of
the prima facie standard, but requiring a modification to accommo-
date reverse discrimination claims.'31 The fact that the prima facie
tests used in the traditional discrimination and reverse discrimina-
tion contexts bear different forms should thus be inconsequential,
since the underlying objective is the same-each test is formulated
to identify the existence of intentional disparate treatment in viola-
tion of Title VII.
The Collins court further asserted that the application of the
"background circumstances" test would necessarily require the
courts "to take on the unseemly task of deciding which groups are
'socially favored' and which ones are 'socially disfavored.'"'32 It is
unlikely, however, that a court would be compelled to make a
determination of which groups are socially favored or disfavored in
today's society. The McDonnell Douglas test is unambiguous in the
context of traditional discrimination; it is a vehicle for persons of
minority status to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment.
The test was premised not on the fact that minorities are discrimi-
nated against in modern society, but rather on the fact that they
were "traditionally disfavored" as opposed to their non-minority
counterparts.'33 Thus, the issue of which groups in today's society
experience unfavorable treatment is irrelevant.'34
The premise upon which the Parker standard is grounded is
legally sound because the application of a modified prima facie
standard puts the traditional discrimination plaintiff and the reverse
discrimination plaintiff on an equal footing. The inquiry of discrimi-
nation may begin in the same place, once the reverse discrimination
plaintiff demonstrates that he, similar to his minority counterpart, is
ted to the law school. As such, plaintiff alleged invidious racial discrimination in viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
"3 See generally Fumco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); see also
Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
131 See Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Parker v. Baltimore and
Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
.32 Collins v. School District of Kansas City, Mo., 727 F. Supp. 1318, 1322 (W.D.
Mo. 1990).
133 See Harding, 9 F.3d at 153; See also Parker, 652 F.2d at 1017.
"3 The D.C. Circuit has declined to address the issue of whether minority status for
purposes of the prima facie test could have a regional or local meaning. See Bishopp v.
District of Columbia, 788 F.2d 781, 786 n.5 (acknowledging that although whites are in
the minority in the District of Columbia, the Supreme Court has never intimated whether
or not minority status could be determined on a "local' basis).
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entitled to an "inference of discrimination." However, despite the
soundness of Parker's reasoning, it suffers from two major flaws.
First, a closer look at the Parker standard reveals that this standard
does not contemplate the existence of employers who discriminate
against members of their own class. The plaintiff who suspects
intentional racial discrimination may find it increasingly difficult to
offer direct evidence of background circumstances supporting the
suspicion that his employer is the type of employer who, despite his
own majority status, discriminates against the majority. The lack of
an available alternative circumscribes the reverse discrimination
plaintiff's ability to vindicate his rights under Title VII, simply
because he and his employer share the same race.
A second flaw of the "background circumstances" test stems
largely from the Parker court's failure to adhere to Supreme Court
precedent. The Supreme Court established the prima facie standard
because it recognized that Title VII plaintiffs often will have to rely
on indirect evidence of discrimination to establish their claims.13
Under the "background circumstances" test, a non-minority
plaintiff may rely on the McDonnell Douglas criteria to prove a
prima facie case of intentional disparate treatment only when back-
ground circumstances support the suspicion that the defendant is
that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority. With-
out more, a majority plaintiff possessing a legitimate claim of dispa-
rate treatment, but lacking direct evidence of such discrimination,
will find himself foreclosed from seeking redress in federal court.
This is true even though his minority counterpart will be permitted
to use indirect evidence to establish a prima facie case. As such,
persons of non-minority status may eventually become discouraged
from asserting their rights under Title VII. This prospect is contrary
to both the fundamental principles of justice and to the underlying
objectives of Title VII.
C. The Better Approach to Reverse Discrimination
In Holmes v. Bevilacqua,136 the Fourth Circuit created an al-
ternative to the four elements of a prima facie case articulated in
McDonnell Douglas. The plaintiff, a black male, alleged racial dis-
crimination in the defendant's failure to promote him. The court
"I See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801-02 (1973).
136 794 F.2d 142, 146 (4th Cir. 1986).
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held that a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of disparate
treatment under Title VII either by direct evidence of discrimination
or by indirect evidence whose "cumulative probative force, apart
from the presumption's operation, would suffice under the control-
ling standard to support as a reasonable probability the inference
that but for the plaintiff's race he would have been promoted."
37
A plaintiff lacking such direct or indirect evidence, would be re-
quired to establish a prima facie case under the traditional
McDonnell Douglas framework.
131
The Tenth Circuit in Notari v. Denver Water Dep't extended
such alternative test to the reverse discrimination context.19 The
plaintiff in Notari was a white male who held various positions with
defendant Denver Water Department. 40 On five different occa-
sions, he applied for the position of Safety and Security Coordina-
tor.4  However, in June 1988, the position was filled by a female
applicant, despite the fact that both of his superiors had determined
that Notari was the best qualified candidate for the position.'42
Notari filed a charge with the EEOC alleging sex discrimination. 43
He subsequently brought suit in the Colorado District Court but lost
on a motion for summary judgment.' His appeal to the Tenth
Circuit followed. 4 '
In considering Notari's claim on appeal, Judge Tacha adopted
the "background circumstances" approach articulated in Parker.'46
He recalled the Tenth Circuit's decision just six years prior in
Livingston v. Roadway Express,'47 where the court held that
[i]t is appropriate "to adjust the prima facie case to reflect' the reverse dis-
crimination context of a lawsuit because the presumptions in Title VII
analysis that are valid when a plaintiff belongs to a disfavored group are




139 971 F.2d 585, 590 (loth Cir. 1992).
140 Id. at 586.
141 Id.
4I Id. at 586-87.
,43 Id. at 587.
'A 971 F.2d at 587.
145 Id.
I4 Id. at 589-90.
147 802 F.2d 1250 (loth Cir. 1986).
'4 Notari, 971 F.2d at 589 (citing Livingston, 802 F.2d at 1252).
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In determining that Notari had failed to establish the requisite back-
ground circumstances, the court held that Notari would not be
permitted to rely upon the McDonnell Douglas framework to estab-
lish a prima face case.'49 However, the court held that a reverse
discrimination plaintiff's failure to allege background circumstances
would not necessarily compel a conclusion that he has failed to
state a prima facie case.' Rather, the alternative test articulated in
Holmes could be used as an additional means for the reverse dis-
crimination plaintiff to establish a prima facie case.'
In adopting the Holmes alternative, the court considered the
existence of two similarly situated employees, one black and one
white. It examined the fates of their respective disparate treatment
claims and recognized that some additional alternative must be
available for plaintiffs pursuing reverse discrimination claims.52
Under such an analysis, the black employee who lacks direct evi-
dence but possesses significant indirect evidence to support his
claim will proceed to state a prima facie case, since the McDonnell
Douglas presumption will be triggered with evidence of his status as
a minority.'53 His white counterpart, however, will be precluded
from establishing a prima facie case without direct evidence sup-
porting the inference that his employer is that unusual employer
who discriminates against the minority.'5 4 In light of this analysis,
the court found such result to be "untenable and inconsistent with
the goals of Title VII," as two similarly situated plaintiffs "should not
be subjected to such dissimilar dispositions."' 5 Consequently, the
court held that the reverse discrimination plaintiff may, in the ab-
sence of direct evidence, establish a prima facie case by offering
indirect evidence "sufficient to support a reasonable probability, that
but for the plaintiff's status, the challenged employment would have
favored the plaintiff."5 6
On remand, the district court found that the evidence presented
at trial was sufficient to state a prima facie case of reverse gender
discrimination." 7 The court noted, however, that the plaintiff had
149 Id.
150 Id.
1I Id. at 590.
152 Id.
153 Notari, 971 F.2d at 590.
154 Id.
155 Id.
1 Id. at 590.
157 Notari v. Denver Water Dep't, No. 89-C-2117, 1993 WL 557848, at *2 (D. Colo.
[Vol. 64: 1
THE NOTARI ALTERNATIVE IN REVERSE DISCRIMINATION
established direct evidence of discrimination, capable of surviving
either the "background circumstances" or the alternative test set
forth initially by the Fourth Circuit in Holmes and adopted by the
Tenth Circuit.158
Under the Notari alternative, allegations that a person of similar
qualifications was the beneficiary of the challenged employment
decision are insufficient to establish a prima facie case. 9 Rather,
the plaintiff must proffer evidence supporting a reasonable inference
that the defendant's discrimination was the actual reason for the
challenged decision, that but for the plaintiff's status the decision
would not have occurred. 60
Although the Notari court did not reach the issue of what
would suffice under the alternative method of establishing a prima
facie case, 161 the Tenth Circuit in Cone v. Longmont United Hos-
pital Association noted that the use of discriminatory statements of
an employer may suffice as circumstantial evidence of employment
discrimination.12 The Cone court held, however, that such state-
ments, without more, would not suffice to establish a discriminatory
animus in employment decisions.6 3 Rather, a plaintiff must estab-
lish a nexus "between the allegedly discriminatory statements and
the [employer's] decision .... ,164 To establish the requisite nex-
us, the comments must be made directly at the plaintiff or the posi-
tion, must be made by a decision maker, and must be made in a
context related to the decision at issue.6
The Notari standard, which has received acceptance at the
district court level, 66 provides a reasonable alternative to the re-
verse discrimination plaintiff who lacks sufficient evidence to estab-
lish a prima facie case under the Parker approach. Like the Parker
standard, this test is higher than that applied in traditional discrimi-





161 Notari, 971 F.2d at 590.




" See, e.g., Schraeder v. E.G. & G., Inc., 953 F. Supp. 1160 (D. Colo. 1997); Tak-
en v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm., 934 F. Supp. 1294 (WA.D. Okla. 1996); Castlebeny v.
Boeing Co., 880 F. Supp. 1435 (D. Kan. 1995).
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to the same inference of discrimination as a member of a tradition-
ally disfavored group. However, the availability of an alternative
means of proof serves to rectify some of the infirmities created by
the imposition of an elevated standard.
Recognizing the need for a modification to a paradigm original-
ly drafted to address traditional discrimination concerns, the Parker
decision undoubtedly changed the landscape of Title V11 jurispru-
dence. The Notari alternative contemplates the logical underpin-
nings of Parker in modifying the McDonnell Douglas standard and
respects the intentions of the framers of Title VII in creating a com-
prehensive scheme, providing evenhanded protection to all Ameri-
cans. By easing the burden on reverse discrimination plaintiffs and
allowing for the use of indirect evidence, the Notari alternative is
consistent with the spirit of Title VII and remains true to its purpose
of enforcing the provisions embodied in the statute.
CONCLUSION
The most logical method by which a reverse discrimination
plaintiff may state a prima facie case under Title VII is that offered
by the Tenth Circuit in Notari. First, majority plaintiffs may take
advantage of the McDonnell Douglas inference of discrimination if
they can show the requisite background circumstances to support a
suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discrimi-
nates against historically favored groups. A majority plaintiff who is
unable to make this showing, however, will be offered an alterna-
tive means by which to state a prima facie case-that which was
first articulated by the Fourth Circuit in Holmes. Under this test, the
plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by presenting direct evi-
dence of discrimination or indirect evidence sufficient to support a
reasonable probability that but for his majority status the employ-
ment decision would have favored him. This alternative, while
enabling majority plaintiffs to assert the same Title VII rights as
similarly situated minority plaintiffs, contemplates both the back-
ground history of Title VII and the historical context within which
the McDonnell Douglas framework was contrived.
Brenda D. DiLuigi
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